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Safety Alert-Hydrate Release

What happened?

A pig was ejected through a closed pig barrel door and travelled over 100 metres across a well pad, over process piping.

Approximately one hour after partially clearing a hydrate at a pig receiver, Operations launched a pig from a well pad towards the same pig receiver where the hydrate was just recently thought to be cleared. The remaining hydrate at the pig receiver prevented the pig from entering the pig receiver when it should have arrived later that day.

The pig combined with the remaining hydrate, was sufficient to block flow from the well pad, resulting in a pressure differential of ~2500 kPa across the pig. While Operations was diagnosing the cause of the pressure increase at the pig receiver location, the hydrate released and the pig was ejected through the closed pig barrel door.

  • Conditions at the pig receiver riser were conducive to hydrate formation.
  • Targeted methanol injection rates were not clearly or formally documented.
  • Hydrate management and pigging procedures allowed for interpretation.
  • Actions taken were consistent with the field team’s understanding that hydrate risk was being managed.
  • Decision points for stopping, depressurizing, or verifying hydrate clearance relied on individual judgment.

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